New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 14
Issue 1 Transitions in Emerging Democracies

Article 3

9-23-1998

What Have We Learned About Postconflict
Elections?
Larry Garber
U.S. Agency for International Development

Krishna Kumar
U.S. Agency for International Development

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Models and Methods Commons
Recommended Citation
Garber, Larry and Kumar, Krishna (1998) "What Have We Learned About Postconflict Elections?," New England Journal of Public
Policy: Vol. 14: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol14/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

We

What Have

Learned

About Postconflict
Elections?
Larry Garber
Krishna Kumar

This article suggests that postconflict elections are a unique subset of transition
elections which deserve special attention. The authors describe the evolution of

some of their more salient characteristics, and offer
preliminary lessons drawn from the recent experiences.
postconflict elections, identify

Throughout

the 1980s, the phrase "transition elections"

was employed constantly by

policymakers, democratic activists, and academic analysts.

It

generally referred to

multiparty elections occurring after years of nondemocratic rule, often in countries with
a prior history of democratic government. Elections in Argentina (1983), Uruguay

Korea (1987), Pakistan (1988), and Chile (1989) exemin Samuel Hunting-

(1984), Philippines (1986), South

phenomena and were featured exhibits
worldwide third wave of democratization.

plify the transition election

ton's notion of a

1

With the demolition of the Berlin wall
to

be applied in three

related, but

in

somewhat

1

989, the transition election moniker began

different, settings: (1) initial elections in the

former communist countries of the Soviet bloc, with the series of elections between
March and June 1990 in East and Central Europe setting the stage; 2 (2) elections in
eral

tices

were quite limited; and

(3) elections that

were scheduled following the cessation of

an internal armed conflict, often as an integral part of a negotiated settlement.
last

sev-

African countries, where previous experiences with formal multiparty electoral prac-

category of elections that

Our

principal thesis

elections

is

is

It is

this

the subject of this article.

that postconflict elections are a unique subset of transition

which deserve special

attention.

Moreover, recent experiences with

postconflict elections provide a wealth of lessons for policymakers and democratic activists.

3

As we

are constantly

from previous experiences
flict is

no easy

made

aware, however, applying the specific lessons learned

in the difficult context of negotiating the cessation of a con-

task.

Treating postconflict elections as a discrete subject has assumed increased importance
as such elections have
civil

war

to peace.

become

the

mechanism of choice

for facilitating the passage

from

Moreover, the occurrence of postconflict elections has become an

important benchmark for the international community in assessing the institutionalization of a peace process.

Both the

fact that

an election has occurred and the quality of the

process have important implications for the withdrawal of international peacekeeping
forces, for the allocation of scarce international assistance resources, for beginning the
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process of reintegrating a country that has been detrimentally affected by civil war into
the

community of nations, and

mation flow, and human

for the creation of openings for external contacts, infor-

rights interventions.

Setting the Stage

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rise of intrastate conflicts that have undermined the very foundation of the state, generated massive migrations, and inflicted widespread suffering on civilian populations. The collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of
superpower rivalry, the growth of ethnic nationalism and worsening economic conditions in parts of Africa and elsewhere have undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon.
Ethnic and religious minorities, tribal groups, ambitious warlords, and marginalized and
discriminated-against populaces have

all

raised the banner of revolt as they seek to re-

dress grievances.

The ferocity that has characterized these intrastate conflicts has forced the internacommunity to reassess various norms and practices that developed during the
Cold War. While the contours of a new order are not fully settled, recent experiences
tional

have kindled a lively debate regarding such issues as forcible intervention
gross

human

rights violations,

more aggressive responses

expanded notions of what peacekeeping operations might
the

same

factors that

have contributed

in

response to

to humanitarian disasters,
entail.

to intrastate conflicts

and

Thus, paradoxically,

have created conditions for

their peaceful resolution.

As major international powers no longer see national conflicts from the prism of Cold
War ideology, they have aggressively sought peaceful solutions to seemingly intractable
and long-standing internal conflicts. The warring factions, meanwhile, bereft of outside
support and suffering from growing war fatigue, have come under intense pressure to
compromise. The recent spotlight on democracy and human rights has contributed a
recognized framework for reconciling political differences. Consequently, several

civil

wars have terminated and the populations of a number of countries have once again

begun breathing

in

an atmosphere of relative peace and reconstructing their shattered

lives.

The Phenomenon Described
The 1989

elections in Namibia, although sui generis for a

the impetus for

much

part of a postconflict settlement.

elsewhere, so

number of reasons, provided

of the more recent developments involving the use of elections as

The

summarized only

story of these elections has
4

The approach

been told

in detail

Namibia was
developed and authorized by the United Nations in 1978, but could be implemented
only after the major antagonists, South Africa and South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), had fought to a standstill and the major powers no longer perceived any
advantage in extending the duration of the conflict. The UN formula called for an extensive international presence in Namibia under UN auspices throughout the transition
it is

briefly here.

utilized in

period.

Most relevant to the present subject, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
was responsible for "supervision and control" over the planned elections in Namibia.
Supervision involved a hybrid between direct administration, which in Namibia was left
to the South African colonial authorities, and a more passive monitoring role, which had

36

many

characterized the international community's involvement in

of the 1980s transi-

mentioned above. Nonetheless, the extensive nature of the supervision

tion elections

Namibia deserves underscoring. On

the ground,

in

involved the presence of more than

it

1,700 election supervisors and 3,500 military personnel in a country with a population
of fewer than 2 million.

More

overall electoral process,

important, the

UN

which was the keystone

had the responsibility

to validate the

for ensuring a cessation of the conflict

and the establishment of an independent Namibia. There was some recognition immediately after the

Namibian elections

perhaps emerging, but

it

new mechanism

that a

for resolving conflicts

was

required utilization outside the very special circumstances of

Namibia for the approach to be fully appreciated. 5
The 1990 elections in Nicaragua provided the next test. Years of intrastate conflict
had resulted in a stalemate, but with the end of the Cold War there was a decrease in
superpower interest. The Central American governments had initiated a peace process
that placed considerable emphasis on the need to guarantee free and fair elections in
each of the countries of the region. This time, however, elections were being planned for
a

member

state

of the United Nations, not a colonized

territory.

Nonetheless, the Nicara-

guan government invited both the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to
monitor upcoming elections. Both organizations responded by establishing long-term
and large electoral monitoring teams
sive exercises

had been undertaken

in the country,

in a

sovereign

marking the

state.

The

first

time such exten-

efforts of the

UN and OAS

teams, together with several nongovernmental organizations, contributed to an electoral

process in which

all

the key parties participated, the voters for the

most part had an op-

some difficult negotiations,
6
all parties accepted a process through which the ruling party was defeated.
There followed a series of elections in Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), El Salvador
(1994), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Liberia (1997) in which the basic ele-

portunity to cast their ballots free of intimidation, and after

ments of the Namibia/Nicaragua, or postconflict election model, have been employed,
with appropriate modifications for the particulars of the circumstances. Several other

(1990 and 1995), Ethiopia (1992), South Africa
West
Bank/Gaza
and
Albania (1997), also share many of the characteris(1994),
(1996),

elections, including those in Haiti

tics

of the postconflict election model.

formal peace accord, which

Its critical

calls, inter alia, for

elements include (1) negotiation of a

a cessation of hostilities and the occur-

rence of elections within a fixed period; (2) intensive administrative preparations for the
elections, involving negotiations concerning the legal

framework, designation of the

election administrators, registration of parties and voters, and arrangements associated

with the procurement of appropriate electoral paraphernalia and

its

distribution through-

out the country within the requisite time frame; (3) responding to an often tenuous security situation

tors,

through the deployment of peacekeeping forces, civilian and police moni-

and the demobilization of armed factions;

(4)

providing for effective participation

by guaranteeing their safe return to their homes
prior to the elections or through absentee ballot and related procedures; and (5) the extensive involvement of the international community in administering, supervising,
monitoring, and otherwise assisting the process.
Perhaps the most important point that needs to be understood about postconflict

by refugees and displaced persons

elections

is

either

that they are invariably organized

under very

though the specific conditions differ from society to

and duration of the
the havoc

conflict, previous levels of

wrought by the war. As a general

difficult circumstances, al-

society,

depending on the nature

economic and

political

development, and

rule, these postconflict countries are politi-
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cally devastated, often with

weak

interim governments responsible for organizing the

elections. Economically, the countries are characterized

by high

inflation,

widespread

unemployment, and shortage of essential goods. Many of the countries face food shortages, and their agricultural and industrial production is quite slack. Transport and communication infrastructures often are shattered, making the movements of people, goods,

and information

difficult.

Postconflict societies also lack the institutional infrastructure required for democratic
elections. In

many

cases, a free press, independent judiciary, democratically oriented

organized political parties, and an independent election commission are either just being

formed or recovering from the physical, psychological, and financial consequences of
war. Further, because of the conflict, a climate of social distrust, antagonism, and frustration exists in postconflict societies,
cratic contestation,

exceedingly

tion of the fighting than a choice

the elected

which makes

political discourse,

difficult. In fact, the elections

among

much

represent

political alternatives,

less demomore a repudia-

with the consequence that

government does not necessarily have a popular mandate

for specific pro-

grammatic choices.
Finally, as noted above, the security situation often remains tenuous.

For example, El

was
Angola and Ethiopia warring factions kept part of their
armies clandestinely, while in Bosnia and Cambodia many parts of the country remained
under the control of militia who had not reconciled to the peace process and were loyal
Salvador

is

the only country mentioned in which demobilization of ex-combatants

completed prior

to elections. In

to the parties contesting the elections. Consequently, the transformation

military organizations into democratic political parties

of the politico-

was hardly complete

at the

time

of the elections.

Efficacy of Postconflict Elections
In considering the efficacy of recent postconflict elections,

it is

important to be aware

to accomplish multiple objectives, some of which are
more conventional elections, postconflict ones are
designed to result in the formation of a new and democratically legitimate government.
However, they are also expected to consolidate a fragile peace by providing former com-

have often been expected

that they

not necessarily compatible. Like

batants a legitimate arena for competition. Indeed, these elections are consciously

viewed as mechanisms

to transform violent conflicts into peaceful

competition for

power.

Of the

recent postconflict elections, significant progress toward reconciliation has

occurred in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mozambique; in these countries, the

former warring groups have been integrated into the emerging political system. Bosnia
enjoys relative peace but

little reconciliation, and there is considerable concern that the
peace can be maintained only with the continuing presence of a rather significant NATO

force.

The Cambodia

situation

is

quite complex: the

ted to the violent overthrow of the regime,

Khmer Rouge, who remain commitnew conflicts

have been marginalized, but

have arisen between the former coalition partners, and more combatants are under arms
than when the peace accords were signed. While it is too early to draw firm conclusions
from the situation in Liberia following the 1997 elections, recent events suggest that
maintaining the peace will not be easy. Finally, fighting erupted in Angola immediately
after its

A

1992

elections,

and

all

efforts to reconcile the warring parties

second objective of postconflict elections

38

is to initiate

have so

far failed.

a democratization process

within a country.

assumed, often naively,

It is

elections generates a

momentum toward

that the

conduct of reasonably free and

further democratization

and

that leaders

fair

who

assume power through electoral means will necessarily abide by democratic norms.
Here again, the record to date is mixed. While developments in several countries are
encouraging, for example, Namibia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the experience in other
countries where postconflict elections transpired is sobering. The 1997 events in Cambodia, where the coalition arrangement that had existed since the 1993 elections fell apart,
highlight the gossamer nature of the democratic transition under way in many of the
postconflict countries.

A

third objective of postconflict elections is to signify a relatively political stability

within a country, warranting the implementation of a massive economic reconstruction

program with resources generated both internally and from donor agencies. Successful
postconflict elections have generally achieved this purpose, with consequent positive
economic growth. Given the devastation of the war, however, and the fact that serious
economic planning is often placed on hold during the period between the peace signing
and the occurrence of the elections, expectations for instantaneous economic improvements are extremely high among the population, and indeed among the international
community, in the aftermath of the elections. These expectations pose an immediate
challenge to a new government, which often must rely on the willingness of the international community to remain engaged rather than simply to declare victory and move on.

Role of the International Community
International assistance
tions, but also to

essential not only for the organization of postconflict elec-

is

ensure their credibility and acceptance.

The

international

community's

extensive role in several postconflict elections, however, has challenged basic develop-

ment

principles regarding local ownership and

far-reaching involvement
nition that failure to

is

empowerment. The justification

based on an absolute mandate

move ahead on

elections

may

result in the

an acceptance of the international community, however defined
stance, as a necessary mediator and prodder,

ments included

The

pattern

in the

breakdown of the peace,
in a particular

circum-

to maintain the time

commit-

peace accord.

and sequence of international

ward, although there

and the desire

for such

to stop the killing, the recog-

is

electoral assistance has

been

straightfor-

considerable variation in the overall extent of the involvement.

During peace negotiations, the international community may provide the services of
legal luminaries

and election experts

to clarify critical issues regarding the nature

and

timing of elections. If peace negotiations are successful, an intergovernmental organization,

such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization for Co-

operation and Security in Europe,

is

often invited to take the lead in administering, su-

pervising, or monitoring the elections.
Inevitably, international organizations

assume greater

roles and responsibilities than

originally envisioned in order to solve pressing logistical, institutional,

and

political

problems. The fine line between technical assistance and political intervention

indeed

in the

is

thin

harsh realities of postconflict societies. Perhaps because of the number of

situations requiring such assistance, the quality of expertise available to help organize or

advise on the preparations for holding postconflict elections has improved immensely

during the past decade. In

fact, the elections in

difficult of circumstances, a technically

Bosnia demonstrate that even

adequate election can be achieved
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if

in the

most

the avail-
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of resources

ability

The

is

not a significant constraint.

precise nature of the international

engagement may surprise some not familiar

with the phenomenon. The three post-Dayton Accords elections in Bosnia provide a

community roles in ensuring timely elections. Dayton
mandated national and municipal elections within nine months of the December 14,
1995, signing of the accords in Paris. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
current example of international

Europe (OSCE) was assigned responsibility for supervising the elections
monitoring human rights and verifying an arms reduction regime.

as well as for

Unlike Namibia, supervision of the 1996 Bosnian elections became tantamount to
administration.

The seven-member Provisional Election Commission (PEC) was chaired

by the head of the

OSCE mission,

and included three Bosnians and three other represen-

community. The PEC's international

tatives of the international

staff drafted the election

law, procured the election materials, supervised the voter registration process inside

Bosnia and

in countries

where Bosnian refugees resided, and developed the plan for the

procurement and distribution of

The

election paraphernalia.

all

OSCE chairman in office (CIO), meanwhile,

was required by Dayton

and

to certify

that conditions in

Bosnia were conducive

date could be

Notwithstanding the fact that several key elements of the accords had

set.

to free

fair elections

not been implemented, most notably relating to freedom of

movement throughout

country and the return of refugees, the Swiss foreign minister,
the time,

made

be scheduled

the requisite certification in

for

September

14, nine

who was

serving as

the

CIO

at

mid-June and authorized that the elections

months

to the

Several weeks before the elections, however, the
to

before the election

day from the signing of the accords.

OSCE CIO

and head of mission agreed

postpone the municipal elections while proceeding with the national elections.

By
tions

election day,

more than 1,000

OSCE election

lawyers and investigators seconded by foreign governments, addressed several

and controversial issues before and

who

An

supervisors were in Bosnia.

Elec-

Appeals Subcommission, which was headed by a Norwegian judge and staffed by
after the elections.

More

than 30,000

critical

NATO

troops,

assume a detached perspective toward the election, eventually carried out key transportation and communication responsibilities, contributing
immeasurably to the, relatively speaking, administrative success of the elections. And for
initially

were directed

election day, a separate

to

OSCE

team, numbering

more than

1

,200,

was dispatched

to the

country to monitor the elections.
In

most other circumstances,

after the initial elections.

this extensive international

involvement abated soon

However, Bosnia has proved more nettlesome, resulting

in the

same high degree of international involvement in 1997 municipal elections and 1998
national elections. These latter elections were noteworthy for the much improved administrative processes, for the more competitive nature of the overall campaign, and the
more unconstrained environment in which the elections took place.
Admittedly, Bosnia reflects unique circumstances, much as Cambodia did a few years
earlier, which had previously been identified as the most costly and extensive international engagement in a postconflict election exercise. In most other circumstances, the
international community engagement has seemed modest by comparison. Nonetheless,
even in these less extravagant settings, the international community role has been momentous and, usually, critical to the occurrence and success of the elections.
Mozambique offers an interesting contrast to Bosnia and Cambodia. Notwithstanding
Mozambique's much more limited resources and a less explicit mandate, the UN and
others in the international

community ensured

that the

40

1994 elections took place and

most controversial aspect of the UN role in
more than $17 million to the political parties, ostensiconducting a meaningful campaign, but viewed more

that all parties participated. Perhaps the

Mozambique was
bly to provide

the provision of

them a basis

for

cynically as an inducement to participate in the process.

Cost and Timing of Postconflict Elections

The

cost of planning, organizing, and monitoring elections, given the extenuating cir-

cumstances affecting postconflict societies, tends
for such high costs are understandable.

the rudimentary transportation and

As noted

to

be comparatively high. The reasons

earlier, postconflict societies

communication infrastructure

lack even

essential for holding

nationwide elections. Undertaking nationwide voter education programs and establishing polling stations in remote areas are inevitably

more expensive

than in more traditional settings. Moreover, because peace

is at

in these

circumstances

stake and the interna-

community is committed to supporting the elections, there is real pressure not to
compromise the integrity of any aspect of the process. These factors often contribute to
the utilization of electoral mechanisms that would be deemed inappropriate if the countional

try

were financing the election without international support. Limited industrial capacity

necessitates that

many

basic electoral commodities

computers, and vehicles

— must be imported

are also needed to create

minimal infrastructure

Mozambique,

the international

cal parties to enable

The high
It

pencils, boxes, typewriters,

for democratic elections; as in the case of

community has provided

assistance to struggling politi-

to participate in the electoral process.

costs of postconflict elections raise several issues that deserve reflection.

One obvious
elections.

them

— paper,

considerable expenditures. Resources

at

issue concerns the opportunity cost of the resources spent

on postconflict

has been suggested that these resources could be allocated instead to ad-

dressing the major social and economic problems facing these countries, including civilian security, repair of shattered physical infrastructure, and basic social

programs such

as

health care and education for marginalized groups.

Another issue relates
tions. In the

to the

precedent for expenditure set by the postconflict elec-

absence of outside assistance,

many

countries simply cannot afford to dis-

burse a fraction of the resources spent to conduct the postconflict election on subsequent
elections.

At the same

time, certain precedents have been created regarding the adminis-

trative processes, as well as sophisticated technologies, that

postconflict elections. Thus, there

is

were

utilized during such

an expectation that international assistance will be

provided to ensure a successful second and even third election. While in

many

circum-

would involve utilizing less
and
resource-intensive administrative processes
technologies that are more appropriate
to the economic and technological resources of the country.
stances such assistance has been forthcoming, an alternative

A further factor that contributes to reliance on
electoral
elections.

mechanisms

seemingly inappropriate administrative

relates to the timetables established for organizing postconflict

These timetables, as observed above, are often dictated by

political consider-

ations rather than a rational assessment of the time necessary to prepare adequately for

the elections. In several instances, the inevitable consequence has been a temporary

postponement of the election, while
all costs,

in other situations the timetable

was maintained

at

including those relating to the credibility of the process.

Among

the adverse consequences associated with unrealistic election timetables

is

that the demobilization of combatants has often not been completed before elections.
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some

political forces

manage

to

maintain their military capabilities and,

if the

resume a military
offensive. This course of events happened in Angola, where the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) resumed the fighting after losing the 1992 elecelection

tions,

outcomes are not

and

in

to their satisfaction, they are in a position to

Cambodia where

the

number of

soldiers loyal to the factions increased

dramatically following the peace accords.

Rigid timelines often have,
tion of an effective civic

in addition, a negative

consequence on the implementa-

and voter education program, thus constraining the potential

democratizing impact of the elections. For example, intermediary organizations that
sought to implement voter education programs in Angola, Ethiopia, and

found

it

extremely

Mozambique

and reach remote areas

difficult to print literature, instruct trainers,

within the stipulated time frame.

Policy Considerations

There are two schools of thought regarding the increased reliance on postconflict elections as a tool for maintaining the

end of an armed

conflict.

The

first

argues that notwith-

standing one outright failure, Angola, and a few instances where there has been both

progress and backsliding, Cambodia, the overall record of postconflict elections

is

posi-

While appropriate lessons must be drawn from prior experiences and an understanding of the particular context in which the model is to be applied is absolutely critical, the
form is sound and deserves to be at the forefront of the tools utilized by a negotiator
trying to end an intrastate conflict.
The second school of thought is more skeptical of the overall record emerging from
the experiences of the past few years. The high costs and rigid timelines associated with
these elections have led to a search for functional alternatives, such as interim powersharing arrangements, which might allow for the reconstruction process to begin without
the immediate pressures of organizing and conducting an election.
While the limitations of postconflict elections must be understood, we are convinced
that such elections will continue to figure prominently in future efforts to move beyond
intrastate conflicts. With this reality in mind, we suggest that policymakers consider the
tive.

following factors in assessing the prospects for a successful postconflict election: (1) the
relative presence of democratic traditions

and participatory social institutions such as

voluntary associations, an emerging middle class economically independent of the

independent media, and local

political units; (2) the

the nature of political mobilization, particularly the degree to
tion relies

on ethnic or sectarian appeals; and

combatants, since

this deters losing parties

(3)

state,

presence of ethnic cleavages and

which

political mobiliza-

progress toward demobilization of

from abrogating the accords and relying on

the military option for achieving power.

Once

it is

decided that an election process will form an integral part of a postconflict

accord, the following policy considerations deserve note. First, the parties to the conflict

should play an active role negotiating the electoral rules of the

game

these rules determined preemptively by an external actor; at the

same

actor

may be

rather than having

time, an external

required to ensure that the negotiations continue and to suggest approaches

for breaking deadlocks. Second, the electoral rules

and mechanisms should be kept
simple to ensure that they can be easily understood by the populace and that they can be

replicated in future elections. Third, a realistic timeline with objective
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benchmarks

should be employed, as the constant need to revise the timeline and postpone the elections serves as a confidence destabilizer and exacerbates feelings of suspicion

and mis-

trust.

Fourth, the pre-election period should be used to rebuild those institutions which are
critical to

both meaningful elections and democratic consolidation; these institutions

include an independent election commission, democratically oriented political parties,

independent media, and nongovernmental organizations that are prepared to assume
responsibility for monitoring the elections and conducting voter education programs.
Fifth, given the

degree of mistrust that often exists within a postconflict society, the

introduction of confidence-building measures, which might involve authorizing the

presence of international observers and requiring periodic certifications that conditions
are conducive to free and fair elections should be

employed during both the

pre- and

postelection periods.
Finally, the international

process

is

community should recognize

only a step in a reconstruction

effort,

and

that a

that a successful election

long-term commitment

is

required following elections to sustain both reconciliation and democratization. Admittedly, recent practice

actions, as

opposed

has not necessarily conformed to

to the rhetoric, of the international

this

admonition. Too often the

community

reflect a shift

back

to

"business as usual" rather than a sincere appreciation of the fact that restoration of trust

and dignity among a population that has experienced a
a short-term endeavor.

bitter intrastate conflict is

never

*®
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